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PART II. 
Chapter III. 
Sparks and Hot Points 
Electric sparks.- The main sources.of dangerous sparks on 
airplanes are the magnetos, the engine ignition circuits, the 
radio, electric light and power wires with their accessories. 
No difficulty in principle is encountered in taking the proper 
safety measures regarding them. They will, in general, give sat-. 
isfactory results, provided they are carefully applied. One of 
the principal measures is the removal of the magnetos as far as 
possible from the carburetors and. fuel pipes, in order to pre-
vent the electric insulating materials from being damaged by pos-
sible leaks,, and the fuel vapors from coming into contact with 
magneto sparks,. in spite of the protection afforded 'by the metal 
casings. The installation, seen in July, 1928, at Orly, on a 
well—known foreign touing airplane, the magneto of which was 
placed close to the carburetor, just behind the joint of the air-
intake pipe (a pipe which, moreover, opens practically inside 
* It Etude sur les Moyens d'Eviter les Incendies a Bord des Avic'ns" 
from Bulletin Technique (Service Technique et Industriel de 
l'Mronautique) No. 56, January, 1929.. Reproduced by permission 
of the author. For Part I, see N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum 
No. 536.
I
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the cowling), is subject to criticism. 
Of course, the electric wires should not run under the fuel 
and. oil pipes, since they would thus be exposed to drippings 
harmful to the insulating materials. Switches and other 
nec (especially those belonging to the radio equipment), which 
may produce sparks, should be enclosed in metal casings. Lastly, 
the safety fuses should not, in melting, be able to project in-
candescent metal into the fuselage. 
The terminals of different polarity should be sufficiently 
separated to prevent the possibility of a short circuit. The 
connections should be proof against being loosened by accidenta] 
shocks and vibrations. Moreover, it is very desirable that pro-
vision be made for comparatively easy access and inspectiorn of 
the back sides of the switchboards. A fire in 1924 was attrib-
uted to the bad condition. of the connections on the back of a 
switchboard which, not being readily accessible, could not be 
adequately inspebted and repaired. 
The engine ignition wires require special precaitions, ow-
ing to their importance for the functioning of the engine, and 
to their proximity to the latter, to the fuel pipes and even to 
the tanks. There is recommended the use of protective battens, 
grouping all the ignition wires over the common portion. of their 
length and gua±ding them against impacts, friction and. fuel and 
oil splashes. The results and the degree of safety thus achieved 
are remarkable. It should not be possible for the connections
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of the wires to the spark plugs to unfasten or slackn' in flight. 
Moreover, when using storage batteries, protective measures 
should be adopted not only against the danger of short circuits 
presented by the exterior terminals, but also against the deto-
nating gases escaping during the charging period.	 Thus, a bat-
tery explosion, followed by fire, the consequences of which were 
fortunately limited, occurred in 1927 on an airplane which had an 
insufficiently ventilated battery compartment. These precautions 
should render it possible to avoid, dangerous electric sparks unde 
normal conditions of operation. They may, nevertheless, occur if. 
the airplane is seriously damaged, its installatione.dislodged 
and bare portions of live wires brought into accidental contact. 
This may occur, but should do so only rarely. I is difficult to 
establish general regulations which will completely prevent this 
possibility.
Exhaust Gases, Fire Screens and Mufflers 
The danger presented by the exhaust gases, valves and corre-
sponding pipes is more imminent than that due to electric sparks. 
In addition to their inherent heat, these gases contain flames 
and. particles of incandescent carbon due to incomplete combustion 
of the fuel, or rust scales due to oxidation of the pipes. Flames 
and- sparks are produced. chiefly when the engine speed is changed. 
suddenly. 
The most obvious means of avoiding these troubles is to 
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 537 
lengthen the exhaust pipes by means of expansion chambers in which 
the gases can expand and cool sufficiently to extinguish any 
flames or sparks before they reach the outside. A narrow-meshed 
screen ccii also be placed at the point of exit of the gases, 
which will remove the incandescent particles without stopping the 
gases themselves. When these expansion chambers are conveniently 
arranged, they muffle the exhaust noise of the engine and thus 
serve the double role of mufflers and fire screens. As a matter 
of fact, designers have hitherto chiefly sought to make good muf-
flers, since engines with direct exhausts soon render the stay 
on airplanes unbearable. Fire prevention has received some atten-
tiom only as a matter of minor importance.	 . 
It has also been endeavored to reduce the glare of the flames 
from the engine rather than to suppress them completely. These 
flames greatly disturb the pilot durIng night flights, especially 
in landing. Although it is rather easy to reduce the glare of 
the flames, it is much more difficult to suppress them completely, 
especially when the engine speed is suddenly changed. However, 
the efficacy of the desired fire-prevention device depends prin-
cipally on the latter condition. Particularly, in the case of 
capsizing or of a rough landing, the engine. may pass directly 
from a high speed to a complete stop, and the absolute absence of 
dangerous flames is then of paramount importance. 
The conditions outlined above and the difficulty of the prob-
lem fully acaount for the fact that the fire screens thus far
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tested have not yet given satisfactory results as regards fire 
protection. Since, however, th problem has been stated, it 
should be possible to solve it at the cost of some ef'fort. 
Assuming that satisfactory fire screens will be made shortly, 
the question arises as to whether their use should be made compul-
sory in order to reduce the fire hazards. In this connection 
some doubt has been expressed by several authorities. They have 
called, attention to the fact that in lengthening the exhaust pipes 
by means of tubes or expansion chambers, the valves and adjaceTlt 
sheet-metal parts are prevented from cooling as quickly and thor-
oughly as would be possible if they were in direct contact with 
the open air. The heat•ing of the valves, if excessive, causes 
serious trouble in the functioning of the engine (seizing of the 
rods, breaking of the valve- stems, impairment of the tightness, 
etc.). This is not the greatest danger, however. It is revealed 
in the case of a bad landing. If the impact of the airplane is 
sufficient to burst the tank or break a pipe, the fuel flows out 
and fills the , air with its v:apors. They grôdually penetrate into 
the muffler and enter imto contact with the hct points. If th 
temperature of the latter is still high enough to cause the car-
bureted air to take fire, there is an imrriediate explosioni. Tests 
made in 1924-26 in the United States, where obsolete airplanes 
were made to crash against obstacles, are indicative in this coi-
nection. ' They reveal the incendiary effect of hot' spots in the 
exhaust pipes in landing accidents. Hence, in. estimating the ef-
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ficacy of a fire screen, it is not enough merely to verify its 
cooling action on the gases and the low temperature of its outer 
envelope, but it is also necessary to make sure that the temper-
ature of its inner portions is sufficiently low to avoid the risk 
of setting fire to the fuel vapors with which it is brought in 
contact in the case of an accident. 
Before issuing regulations regarding the precautions to be 
taken in this connection, the S.T.I.A. made the following tests, 
in an attempt to determine the admissible limiting temperture 
Different fuels were poured drop by drop on an electrically heated 
metal plate ond the temperature was measured, above which each 
fuel ignited on contact with the plate. Under these conditions, 
gasoline took fire at a temperature of the plate of 58000 (1076°F), 
gas oil at 560°C (1040°F), mineral lubricating oil at 500°C 
(932°F), and the safety fuels referred to above, at 620 to 65000 
(1148 to 1202°F). The same fuels were also projected against the 
plate in the form of vapors, after passing through a suitably 
heated tube. The vapors were found to take fire at the same tem-
peratures as the liquid, without appearing to be affected by the 
heating temperature in the tube. 
The results merit consideration. They show, in the first 
place, that according to the assumed hypothesis (i.e., the pro-
jection of fuel against a muffler 'after a hard landing) oil is 
as dangerous as gasoline, since it takes fire at a lower tempera-
ture of the plate. Hence, oil tanks must be separated from en-
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7
gine compartments by bulkheads, the same as fuel tanks, so as to 
prevent, as completely aspossi)le, leaking oil from coming in 
contact with the mufflers. It is also seen that, although there 
is an actual superiority of safety fuels over gasoline (according 
to the above hypothesis), it is ñôt so great that we can neglect, 
in using them, the precautions regarding mufflers which have been 
found necessary in the case of gasoline. 
Besides, these considerations were confirmed by the following 
tests, made at the end of 1928, by Chief Engineer Caillol of the 
ST.I.Aé. Fuel, in drops and in a sheet, was poured on the out-
side of a muffler of a recently approved typë 	 The thuffler had 
been heated by prolonged running of the engine The engine it-
self wasplaced on a bench, in an air flow of apprOximately 100 
km/h (62.1 mi./hr.). The engine was suddenly stopped and gaso-
line was dropped on the muffler a few seconds later. No fire oc-
curred, which was quite natural, since the temperature of the 
o	 0 
sprinkled walls was not over 400 0 (75 F) 	 The test was then 
repeated, but the fuel was inijeôted inside the muffler. The gas-
oline took fire immediately. This also occurred with the safety 
fuels, but only within a few seconds after the injection.. The 
phenomena are self-explanatory. The internal portions of the 
muffler had local hot spots, the temperature of which exceeded 
the critical value indicated above. The fire took place as soon 
as the fuel or its vapors caxLle into contact with these hot spots, 
the quickness of the contact depending on the v3latility of the
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liquid injected. 
These data can be used in an attempt to produce efficient 
mufflers and fire screens, without increasing the danger of fire. 
In this connection, experimental indication is given by the air-
plane crash tests mde in the Uiiited. States (Fig. 4 - see Tech-
nical Memorandum No. 536, Part I of this report). They comprise, 
in particular, a comparative test, during which sixteen airplanes 
were crashed. Ten were provided with aluminum mufflers, arranged 
so as to be well cooled by the relative wind. Five exhausted di-
rectly into the air. The last airplane was equipped with a steel 
muffler of the so-called 'saxophone type. A single fire occurred 
in the course of the sixteen tests. This was on the arplane witl 
the steel muffler, which Was cooled the least. 
Independently of the American results, the previously men-
tioned hot-plate tests indicate the goal which must.be pursued in 
order to improve mufflers from the viewpoint of fire prevention. 
It consists primarily in reducing the. temperature of the hottest 
portions of exhaust manifolds below the burning point - 580PC 
(1076°F) for gasoline. After this result has been achieved, it 
will be possible, if necessary, to lengthen the exhaust pipe by 
means of sound or flame-reducing devices. But as long as the 
cooling at the origin is not assured, any prolongation of the 
exhaust will cause the heat to be. retained at. the origin and hence 
retain the fire hazard instead of removing it. Of course, the 
cooling system must act immediately at the outlet of the engine 
cylinders... It may consist of aluminum, as in the American tests,
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 537 	 9. 
c r: of thin steel with fins., tubular wire gauze, or any other 
equivalent device. 
The above considerations assume that the hot spots are red-
hot metal portions of the exhaust pipes. However, it often hap-
pens that gases, incompletely burned in the cylinders, coitain 
carbon. particles which are deposited in the exhaust pipes. In
the first place, the occumulations of coke and- soot cause a re-
duction in the cooling capacity of the walls coated by them. The 
chief trouble, oweve, is that they may contaii. incandescent 
particles of coke. From our viewpoint, these particles, owing 
to their high temperature, form particularly dangerous hot points. 
It is rather difficult to mce general suggestions for their com-
plete eliminatiom. We can say, however, that irnproed original 
cooling of the exhaust manifolds reduces the danger from the coke 
deposits. In designing a new type of muffler, one can then de-
termine experimentally whether it has a tendency to accumulating 
soot at its hottest points and how to combat-it. It is only nec-
essary to make, as certain designers already do, test models 
which are cut by a longitudinal plane and which can be easily 
opened for inspectiorL after being used for some time. 
Tests recently made by the S.T.1,Lié. show that it is possible, 
on the basis of these cbservations, to make efficient mufflers 
which do not involve so great fire hazard-s. It has been found 
possible to inject gasoline and safety fuels into one of these 
mufflers, immediately after stopping the engine, without producing 
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fire. Following the experiments of 1924-26, the Americans have 
suggested the application of similar tests to every new fire 
screen submitted for approval. 
The tests begun in France will be continued, especially by 
systematic temperature measurements of internal portions of the 
exhaust manifolds under normal conditions of flight. Pending , the 
final results, the particular attention of muffler designers is 
called to the foregoing considerations, the importance of which 
is often not understood. It is probably because their applica-. 
tion has been neglected, that serious fires have so often occurred 
after partial crashes. 
Lastly, even a good muffler is not sufficient in itself, but 
much depends on its correct installation. Two factors which 
greatly affect the fire hazard in the case of fuel leaks should 
be considered in this connection. They are the rapidity with 
which the hottest portions of the exhaust pipes and valves cool 
after the engine stops and the time elapsing before the fuel and 
oil come in contact with them. If this time is increased,there 
is more time for the heat accumulated in the exhaust to disperse 
in the air. 
Measures for retarding the progress of the fuel toward the 
engines will be described later. As to the measures for the 
quick cooling of the manifolds after stopping the engine, each 
case must be studied by itself. As a matter of fact, these meas-
ures do not simply vary for different mufflers, but also for the
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same muffler when used. on different engines. Thus, a muffler 10-
cated in the V formed by the two rows of cylinders, may be suf-
ficiently cooled as long as the air is circulated. iii flight, but 
will remain hot long after the engine stops, since it is directly 
affected by the intense heat radiation of the surrounding parts. 
The same muffler, placed. on the' side, will cool much faster. This 
leads to the conclusion that one should avoid-, if possible, plac-
ing exhaust pipes and mufflers in the V of the engines. 
To sum up, the presence of a fire-screen muffler increases 
the safety against fire, as long as the conditions of flight re-
main normdl. If, on the other hand, fuel is spilled after a bad 
landing, the situation is reversed. and the presenc of an inade-
quate device may greatly increase the danger it was designed to 
remove. 
Obviously, in addition to the fundamental qualities discussed. 
above, fire-screen mufflers must satisfy the following conditions: 
relative lightness and lw aerodynamic resistance; low absorp-
tion of engine power; insulation of their walls from combustible 
parts of the airplane; good resistance to vibrations, impacts 
arid oxidation by gases at high temperatures. 
Heating the intake air.- The question of heating the carbu-
retrs and intake air is closely related to the exhaust problem 
considered above.* The intake pipes and carburetors of powerful 
engines collect frost in cold, damp weather. On certain engines, 
*1 am indebted. for many of the data in this treatise to the cour-
tesy of Chief Engineer Hardy, of the S.T.I.Aé.
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this phenomenon may occur even at relatively high temperatures 
of 10 to. 15°C (50 to 59°F). It is accompanied by a rapid de-
crease in the engine speed. Sometimes, the decrease may last, 
and in some cases it may be followed by a jerky running of the 
engine, with periodical rises and falls in the number of revolu-
tions. When the cold is intense and. protracted, the ice which 
forms inside the carburetor may obstruct the carburetor jet and 
block the controls. It then causes serious engine trouble. On 
the other hand, it was seen in Chapter II (Technical Memorandum 
No. 536 - Part I of this report) that extending the air intake 
pipes to the outside of the cowling, deemed necessary as a pro-
tection against fire, increased the tendency p1 the carburetors 
to collect frost. 
The heating of' the carburetors and their intake pipes is 
not only a means of improving the regularity of the enginP, but 
is also a direct consequence of the measures taken to avoid con-
flagrations due to back fires. It was also seen that safety 
fuels could not be used without thoroughly heating the carbure-
tors. This fact increases the importance of the devices pro-
posed for this purpose. Whatever fuels are used, it is impor-
tent that heaters introduce no additional fire hazard. 
In order to combat frost, we may heat either the air before 
it reaches the carburetor, or the carburetor itself, or else the 
carbureted air as it leaves the carburetor. 
1. On many ol.d engines the air was heated before it reached
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the carburetor, by locating the end.s of the air-intake pipes in-
side the cowling on the hot portions of the engine. We have, 
however, pointed out the danger of fire involved in this arrange-
ment, which is no longer authorized in principle. Under these 
conditions we must use either water or oil radiators in the in-
take pipe, or we must use a special exhaust-gas pipe running 
through the intake pipe. Of course, water radiators cannot be 
used on air-cooled eng±nes. Besides, both water and oil radia-
tors are relatively heavy and not easily adjustable to the tern-
perature variations of the surrounding air. If the radiator 
gets too hot, the quantity of air per cylinder volume may be re-
duced and a considerable fraction of the engine power lost. 
Moreover, in attempting to start in cold weather or to pick up 
after a long dive with engine stopped, the water or oil may get 
cold and fail to heat just when it is most needed. 
Preheating, by means of exhaust gases, does not cause the 
same troubles, but it involves a serious danger of fire in the 
two following cases:
a) The pipe which runs through the air intake is not per--
fectly gas-tight, either due to joint leakage •or to the perfora-
tion of the walls by oxidation. I this case, hot gases, flames 
or incandescent particles may be introduced directly into the 
carburetor. 
b) The hard impact of a bad landing tears off or dislodges 
the heating pipe at the point where it enters the air-intake 
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pipe. Direct communication is thus established between the ex-
haust and intake pipes, which may immediately result in a fire 
if the engine is still running. 
In principle, no difficulty is encountered in preventing 
the first case. Thick pipes, wit a strong and. well-protected 
connections, answer the purpose. Unfortunately, quite differ-
ent conditions are encountered in the second case, because the 
damage from an abnormal impact is too diversified to enable the 
necessary precautions against all its possible effects. 
It is important, however, to take at least one precaution, 
namely, to place the air intakO and its heating pipe where they 
will not be the first parts of the engine to strike the obstacle. 
Thus, for example, the air intake should be located rather high 
and well aft, so that a cylinder would have to be torn off first, 
or a large portion of the crank case knocked in, before it would 
be reached. Under these conditions, one would be almost certain 
that the feared communication between intake and exhaust would 
not be established before the engine would be completely stopped 
and its incendiary action suppressed. However, in. spite of the 
good results which may be achieved by this precaution, it is 
better to avoid, if possible, heating the air by means of the 
exhaust gases and to heat the carburetor instead, as explained 
below. 
2. One can heat the body and the float chamber of a cal-
buretor either by a water or oil by-pass .or by an exhaust-gas
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by-pass. Water and oil are naturally open to the objection 
which has already been encountered in connection with the ques-
tion of heating the intake air. They are ill adapted to cold 
starts and to picicing up in flight after a long stoppage of the 
engine. Aside from this, however, experience shows that heating 
by means of the radiator water is very satisfactory and easy to 
regulate. 
Unfortunately, it cannot be used on air-cooled engines. 
or exhaust gases. Heating by 
the relatively small oil re-
required temperature level 
however, does not apply to 
of which heats very slowly. 
aises the temperature of the 
For these we must resort to the oil 
oil is possible on light airplanes, 
serve of which rises quickly to the 
after the engine is started. This, 
large airplanes, the great oil mass 
On such airplanes, the oil seldom r 
carburetor sufficiently. 
In oider to remedy the disadvantages resulting from heating 
with the water or oil at the take-off and to provide the addi-
tional heat required when oil is used, it has been proposed to 
supplement these methods by using the exhaust gases. The method 
of heating by the exhaust gases would then be used only in emer-
gencies, such s starting, picking up and flying in very cold. 
weather, being cut out under normal conditions. The fire haz-
ards involved in this system are thus greatly redubed. On the 
other hand, we may criticise this combination for. its relative 
complexity of installation and of operation.
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It remains to examine the question of heating the carbure-
tors by thens of the exhaust gases. It is to be feared that, as 
far as fire hazards are concerned, thismethod. be open to objec-. 
tions similar to those mentioned. above in connection with the 
intake air., These objections, however, are greatly weakened 
by the folloving considerations. When air is to be heated, its 
poor conductivity calls for a high temperature of the heating 
gas, a great output and large radiating surfaces. The direct 
exhaust flow of one or several cylinders must therefore be used 
in most cases, always with large pipes, provided with a highly 
developed system of fins. On the other hand, the carburetor 
and the fuel which it contains have a high degree of conductiv-
ity. Hence, a rather small quantity of gas af a relatively low 
temperature will provide the requisite heat. 
Experience shows that good. heating is generally obtained 
by sending a small portin of the main exhaust flow into the 
carburetor jacket. The amount can. be regulated by a throttle 
placed at the origin, in such a manner that the temperature of 
the delivered gases remains below the value, beyond which there 
is danger of igniting the fuel in case of. rupture or leakage of 
the pipes. In this connection, a maximum. temperature of 350°C 
(662°F) for the carbureto envelppe and of approximately 4500.0 
(842°F) for the heating gas seems to be about right. Besides, 
the fo'ilowing test shows, without making accurate temperature 
measurements, whether the requisite safety conditions are satis-
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fled for any given engine type. After interrupting the gas by-
pass below its throttle valve and letting the gases escape into 
the open air, we can make sure that a pad-soaked with gasoline 
and exposed to these gases, is not ignited by'theni. Besides, 
as an additional precaution, the by-pass pipe can be placed in 
a region.. where it will be protected from destructive impacts.. 
Its s:Liall size and the proximity of the carburetor will facili-
tate the achievement of thi additional, guaranty. 
3. We have just seen how the intake air or the carburetor 
and its accessories are heated. The carbureted air should, 
moreover, be kept ho until it enters the engine. The coldest 
spot of the carburetor is usually near the Venturi tubes. Hence, 
fuel condensation and irregular carburetion. may be feared if, 
after heating the air before or in the carburetor, it is left 
to cool immediately afterward. I most cases, the proper temper-
ature can be satisfactorily maintained by the circulation of 
water or oil, or simply by ecourse to the conductivity of the 
hot portions of the engine. The corresponding devices present 
no special difficulty nor require any particular precaution. 
All the above considerations show the importance of heating 
the air before its adrnission into the engine. They also show 
the necessity of carefully designing the heating devices, in or-
der to 'avoid serious fire hazards. When heating by the radiator 
water is possible, it is the simplest and safest means. Other-
wise, and especially in the case of air-cooled engines, one
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum Ng. 53? 	
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should, in principle, resort to the heating of the carburetor by 
a by-pass from the exhaust pipe. It is possible to use exhaust 
gases without danger of fire, only by taking very complete pre-
cautions. These precautions, however, can be easily taken, ex-
cept in very special cases. 
Chapter IV
Precautions to be Taken in Anticipation of Hard. Landings 
The regulations in Chapters II (Technical Memorandum No. 
536 - Part I of th.is report) and III should suffice to eliminate 
most possibilities of fire in flight, as long as no serious en-
gine trouble develops. Besides, their efficäcyj.s confirmed by 
experience. They do not suffice, however, in the case of major 
engine troubles or when the airplane lands on its nose. The 
latter case is by far the most dangerous one. Its consequences 
reproduce, on a larger scale, those iesulting from engine trou-
bles. It is better for us to consider the case of fire produced 
by a bad landing. This phenomenon develops along well-known: 
lines somewhat as follows. The airplane strikes the ground, the 
impact dislodges the eigine and it accessories. The pipe con-
nections spring aleak or separate, while the pipes break. In 
the most serious cases the fuel tank bursts open, the carburetor 
float chamber is knocked. in or torn off. Eventually the fuel 
leaks and. fornis a dangerous explosive mixture. 
If the pilot, for want of time or attention, does not cut
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the ignition, the engine strikes the obstacle while still run-
ning.* The immediate stop caused by the ground, starts fire in 
the exhaust manifold and back fires at the intaice. A spark due 
to a broken ignition circuit or electric distribution wire, or 
a contact of the fuel vapors with the hot spots of the manifold 
may also occur. They all cause the ignition of the carbureted 
air, which explodes. It is particularly difficult to combat 
the ensuing general conflagration. since it is fed' by vapors 
which are spread everywhere. 
If the.fuel tanks cannot be isolated at the very beginning 
of the acciden from the field of the conflagration, either by 
a stopcock or by means of a tank-dumping device, and especially 
if the tanks are broken open by the impact, theircontents will 
feed the fire and increase its violence. 
Precautions of a general character.- The order of the phe-
nomena analyzed above, indicates the means of stopping or de-
laying their progress. The first and. most common. means is to 
enable the pilot to cut the ignition as soon as a crash becbmes 
inevitable. Besides, the switch is usually placed within easy 
reach of the pilot, and its installation. involves no difficulty 
unless the airplane is of the multi-engine type. In this case, 
the pilot should be able, at will and according to circumstances, 
either to cut the ignition of any engine separately or to cut 
*Engines with a high compression ratio sometimes continue to run, 
under the action of auto-ignition:phenomena, even after their 
normal ignition is cut. In this respect they involve serious 
danger and hence require even more than an ordinary engine, anti-
fire precautions in the case of a bad landing.
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the ignition of all the engines together by means of a single 
switch. The feeling of safety which this arrangement will give 
him, will greatly compensate for the relative complexity of the 
electric circuits. 
Certain inventors, impressed by the accidents which happen 
when the pilot fails to cut the ignition in time, have suggested 
devices which break the ignition circuit as soon as the airplane 
encounters difficulties, especially during stalls. The danger 
entailed by the untimely functioning of such devices, has al-
ways rightly prevented their use. 
We have already considered the devices which make it possi-
ble to avoid back-firing at the air inlet and flames in the ex-• 
haust pipe. Hence, there is no occasion to revert to them here. 
We will only call attentiomto the fact that, in order to play 
their part, the fire screens and devices for preventing back 
fires, must not be damaged too soon, when the engine strikes an 
obstacle. It is therefore highly advisable to place them in a 
portion of the cowling where they will be relatively well pro-
tected and where, in any case, they will not be struck before 
the vital parts of the engine. The mufflers, intake pipes and 
carburetors are often located at the front end of the engine, 
so that they are the first accessories to be torn off or 
crushed by the obstacle. Under these conditions, the engine 
may continue to rotate for a fraction of a second, with the 
valves exhausting into the open air, the carburetor being broken
a 
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and the air flowing back toward the inlet. This is all that is 
necessary to start a fire; which might have been prevented, if 
the heavy parts of the engine had been the first to be broken, 
thus causing it to stop before the emission of dangerous flames. 
Besides, we may ask whether it would not be advisable to 
add to the above precautions. ii the bows of ships there are 
shock compartments which are crushed and which damp the effect 
of collisions, before the vital parts of the hull are reached. 
The first and last cars on passenger trains likewise act as 
buffers. There is no such arrangement on airplanes. On single-
engine airplanes the impact is primarily received by the propel-
ler shaft and the engine, with which the destruction begins. 
Since the engine, crank shaft and. crank case form a rigid mass, 
it has the effect of a veritable ram which drives everything 
behind it. 
It would seem possible, at least in certain cases (e.g., 
for engines with reduction gear, where the distance between the 
propeller and the crank case is greater than on direct-drive 
engines) to protect the engine by surrounding its front portion 
with a truss or cage of angle irons, strongly attached to the 
fuselage. This truss would be crushed by the impact, before the 
engine and its principal accessories would be damaged. Even if 
we admit that this protecting cage can only partially damp vio-
lent impacts and does not suffice to prevent the dislodging of 
the engine, it will nevertheless increase the interval of time
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between the stopping of the engine and. the destruction of the 
fuel pipes arid fire-prevention devices. It is of capital impor-
tance to gain time in such cases. 
In addition to landing impacts, conflagratios are often 
caused by back fires atthé inlet, even when the above-mentioned 
precautions have been taken. This occurs when the rupture of a 
connecting rod, -iii the neighborhood of the carburetor, causes 
the latter to be torn off and lays open the inlet to the cylin-
ders.
If the pilot cuts the fuel supply as he ought to, the 
quantity of ignited fuel is reduced to the gasoline contained 
in the carburetor and in the adjacent pipes. The fire will not 
be so intense as to render extinction imposible, provided the 
airplane is adequately equipped for this purpose. It is never-
theless advisable, in order to avoid such risks, to place back-
fire prevention devices as closely as possible to the cylinders, 
and to separate the carburetors from the splash area of the con-
necting rods, in so far as the other general arrangements of the 
engine will permit. 
In this connection, attention is again called to the para-
mount importance of draining fuel and, oil leakages outside of 
the fuselage in the most direct way possible, whether they are 
due to an injury to the engine, the breaking of a pipe or to 
any other cause.
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 537 	 23 
Isolation of the Engine Compartment and Tanks 
The engine compartment is a hot chamber where the slightest 
accident can start a fire, One should therefore reduce to a mm-
imurn the combustible elements which it contains. Besides, it 
should be isolated from the airplane proper so as to prevent 
the spreading of incipient fires.. All agree on the necessity 
of a fireproof bulkhead (fire wall) between the 'engine and the 
rest of the airplane. No large fuel or oil receptacle (except 
the carburetor) should be placed on the same side of the fire 
wall, as theengine. Means should be provided, for the immediate 
isolation of the main fuel and oil tanks (especially the fuel 
tanks) from the pipes leading to the engine . and passing through 
the fire Wall. The isolation should be effected by means of a 
quick-closing cock operated y the pilot. Each stopcock must 
be placed as close as possible to the tank which it is designed 
to protect. If, after a certain length of time, it is feared 
that a quick-closing cock is no longer perfectly tight, it should 
be supplemented by a slow-motion cock. The former would be used 
by the pilot only in case of emergency, but the latter would be 
used under normal conditions of operation. The fireproof bulk-
head serves a double purpose. It is designed to prevent the 
flames, originating in the engine compartment, from spreading to 
the body of the airplane. It is also intended to prevent exter-
nal fuel leakage from getting into the engine compartment. 'In 
order to stop the flames, the bulkhead must be metal and pro-
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vided, if possible, with a heat-resistant lining	 It often con-
sists of two metal sheets with an intermediate sheet of asbestos. 
The fire wall should not be strictly confined to the transverse 
section of the fuselage, but should be prolonged at right angles. 
to the transverse section in both directions. 
Flames stopped by the transverse bulkhead actually tend. to 
burst through the sides of the engine compartment. They are 
the 
then swept back on the airplane by/relative wind, if the fire 
breaks out during flight, or by normal draft, if it occurs on 
the ground after a landing on the nose. We cannot prevent the 
flames from burstng forth, especially through the ports provided. 
in the cowling for the ventilation of the engine, but we can 
separate the ports from the bulkheads and render the intermediate 
cowling sufficiently gas-tight, so as to increase the distance 
traversed. by the flames materially, thus reducing their harmful 
effect. The fire wall should also be extended along the sides 
of the fuselage in the direction opposite to the engine compart-
ment. Otherwise, the fuel escaping from the tanks or pipes, 'cr0-
en by a landing impact, will flow on and aiourd the bulkhead, 
without encountering any obstacle, and soon reach the possible 
location of the fire. When, however, the fire wall is extended 
laterally by sufficiently long metal walls (e.g., 20 to 30 cm - 
7.9 to 11.8 in.), the fuel will be stopped. by the relatively 
tight basin thus formed. It will not pass this barrier -unless 
the leakage is very large. Besides, the flooding would not 'be
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immediate. Thus, the safety is increased by simultaneously re-
ducing the danger of fire and increasing the time it will take 
to break forth. The extension of the fire wall, by metal ei-
ents, is generally adequatein the direction of the engine, but 
not in the opposite direction. Thus, we often see the wood 
planking of the fuselage enter into direct contact with the 
netal of the fire wall, as though it sbught to get as close as 
possible to the eventual location of' a fire. This arrangement, 
for which no adequate reason can be given, greatly reduces the 
efficacy of the barrier. 
Of course, the points where pipes and controls pass through 
the bulkhead must be perfectly fuel-tight and fireproof. In gen-
eral, it will be possible to satisfy these conditions hy using 
stuff ing boxes. One may also have recourse to special ball and 
socket joints which will reduce the danger of' jamming and change 
of level especially in the case of rigid controls. On examining 
the fire walls with which most airplanes are provided, we are 
struck by the carelessness of their installation, characterized 
by the absence of joints or stuffing boxes and by the existence 
of wide openings on the sides and at the upper portion. 
Still, everybody agrees on the necessity of opposing corn-
plete andresistentbarriers to the fire. For those who still 
remain skeptical, we will merely remind them of the accident 
which happened at the beginning of 1928, on an observation air-
plane in Syria. Fire had broken out, following an engine break-
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down due to faulty. lubrication. The fire wall retained the main 
mass of flames long enough to enable the two men of the crew to 
save themselves by jumping with their parachutes but, owing to 
the poor design of the barrier, they were badly burned by the 
hot gases and tongues of flame which it allowed to pass, thus 
preventing them from successfully combaing the fire. 
The above Oonsiderations apply particularly to the case of 
an airplane with its engine located in the axis of the fuselage, 
with the fuel tank behindit. The precautions will vary if the 
engines are of the lateral type or if the tanks are located n 
the wings, but the principles to be observed remain the same.. 
Although a carefully designed 'ire wall affords real pro-
tection against conflagrations in flight, it is unfortunately 
less satisfactory in the case of a fire following a landing on 
the nose. The engine, thrust backward by the ground, acts like 
a ram on the fire wall, which it knocks in. In some cases, the 
latter is struck by the tank, inadequately secured by its at-
tachment fittings. Finally, in some cases, the engine after 
forcing the fire wall, hits the tank which it also knocks in. 
This condition is particularly dangerous since it creates a fuel 
leakage and simultaneously facilitates its direct access to the 
engine compartment. 
We considered in Chapter II (Technical Memorandum N. 536, 
Part I of this report), the conditions which the tanks and their 
fittings must satisfy, in order to withstand direct landing im-.
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pacts. We need not revert to the subject here. As regards the 
crushing of the fire wall by the engine, we must in most cases 
confine ourselves to reducing its effects, without absolutely 
removing the possibility. We can, in particular, either protect 
the engine proper against landing impacts, or place it farther 
from the fire wall (if permitted by the weight distribution of 
the airplane), or else reinforce the fire wall itself. 
It will be observed in this connection that present-day 
fire walls are not designed to withstand even slight impacts. 
Their function is confined to stopping fuel and flaries (more or 
less well, as seen above). It would, however, be easy in many 
cases to reinforce at least the portion directly opposite to 
the projecting part of the engine, without greatly increasing 
the weight. 
Lastly, it is necessary to prevent the engine from striking 
the tank after passing through the fire wall. The measures to 
be taken in this connection are too closely related to local 
conditions to be specified in advance. We shall therefore con-
fine ourselves to the following suggestions 
a) Place the fuel tanks at a certaim distance - 10 to 15 
cm (3.94 to 5.9 in.) - from the fire wall, so as to allow for 
a considerable deformation of the latter before it comes in con-
tact with the tanks. 
b) Avoid locating the tanks exactly in the axis of the en-
gine. It is usually possible to place them on either side of
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the axis, so that the projecting parts of the engine which 
first strike the bulkhead, will not immediately afterward come 
in contact with the tanks. 
c) Protect the tanks by a special elastic covering, dé-
signed to keep it tight even after deformation or rupture. Some 
of these cOverings sire quite efficacious against machine-gun bul-
let holes and may also be used in the present case. However, 
most of them finally become saturated With fuel, especially when 
a tank springs a leak. If the leak is not immediately discov-
ered (which is difficult, since the protective covering conceals 
the walls and their seas) the covering becomes a veritable 
spoige soaked with a combustible liquid. Under these conditions 
the remedy is worse than the danger which it is designed to avoid. 
The best means of preventing the engine from striking the 
tank consists in placing them well apart. This is achieved by 
placing the fuel tanks in the wings, above and behind the engine 
compartment. This disposition is most advantageous from the 
viewpoint of fire protection and is highly advisable whenever 
the general arrangement of the airplane permits. 
Lastly, the question as t.O whether arrangements should be 
made for quickly dropping or emptying the fuel tanks in flight 
has been much discussed. This would enable the pilot to elimi-
nate the main explosive mass as soon as there should be danger 
of fire reaching it, thus greatly reducing the violence of the 
calamity.
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The tank-emptying devices hitherto used on airplanes gener-
ally, have their disadvantages. They drain off in a fewseconds 
all the fuel desired, but do not render it possible to control 
the path of the liquid after it has left the tank. Thus, it may 
come in contact with the fuselage (especially at the end of the 
operation when the expulsive pressure is low) or simply create 
a dangerous carbureted atmosphere about the airplane. Besides, 
it is rather paradoxical. to seek safety by scattering fuel, even 
at some distance from a fire. The rapid emptying of the tanks 
should therefore be authorized only in particular . cases, e.g., 
on certain military airplanes exposed to the action of incendi-
ary bullets and. without means for dropping the tanks. Even in 
this case, special precautions must be taken to prevent the evac-
uated fuel from passing too near the fuselage and its accesso-
ries, even if the airplane dives suddenly. 
Modern tank-dropping devices are not subject to such serious 
objections. They have been successfully used on many military 
airplanes and quite recently on a pursuit airplane under test at 
Cazaux. This airplane had performed several stunts in the course 
of which the overflow pipe of the tank had leaked slightly. The 
flame of an insufficiently protected machine-gun fire ignited 
the fuel in the cowling. By dropping the tank, the pilot was 
able to prevent the conflagration from spreading and to land 
safely. The use of tank-dropping devices necessitates installa-
tion:s which are often quite heavy. In the first place, there
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must be provided, in the pipes connecting the tank and engine, 
weak points designed to break as soon as the tank is dropped. 
These weak points, more than any others, are subject to injuries 
and leaks. On the other hand, the tank must be carefully guided 
during its fall until it hs completely left the fuselage. The 
guiding process presents no mechanical difficulty, so long as 
the airplane flies horizontally or at a slight angle, but it may 
cease to work satisfactorily when the airplane dives vertically. 
It is often in such cases that the dropping of the tank does the 
most good, since it diminishes the danger of explosion always 
presented by a landing on the nose. 
Lastly, the tanks and their guides are generally deformed 
easily, because the elements of which they are bonstructed are 
given the minimum dimensions so as to reduce the weight. Hence, 
jamming or friction often occur in operation, thus impeding the 
correct dropping of the tank after it has been released. One 
can easily realize the critical situation of an airplane, flying 
with a half-dropped tank, the pilot being unce±tain whether he 
will be able to get rid of it in time to avoid a catastroph. 
In any case, it is necessary to verify carefully, by periodical 
in spection s, the good functioning of the tank-dropping devices 
on airplanes in service.. 
Except for the above reservations, the use of tank-dropping 
devices should be made compulsory on military airplanes exposed 
to the fire of incendiary bullets. They are recommended for
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transport airplanes whenever their installation is compatible 
with the general arrangement and with the correct balancing of 
the airplane. However, we should. not consid..er the c.ropping 01 
the tanks as a panacea taking precedence over all other means 
fbr preventing fires. It is better, on cdrnmercial airplanes, 
to p1ce the tanks well away from the engines and to renounce 
the possibility of dropping them in flight, rather' than to locate 
them near the engines in order 'to facilitate the installation 
of a dumping device. Besides, the position of 'the fuel tanks is 
determined by the weight distribution corresponding to the dif-
ferent load conditions and not by considerations affecting tank-
dropping devices, however important they may be. 
Ohapter V
Various Precautions 
Fire extinRuishers. 	 If fire breaks out in spite of the 
measures taken against it, the crew should have means of com-
bating it and, if possible, of extinguishing before its progress 
renders a catastrophe inevitable. The sooner the crew can inter-
vene, the more efficacious will its action be. Its safety will 
often depend on seconds. These new equirements are met by fire 
extinguishers and alarms. Stationary extinguishers are the most 
powerful and effective. Recent statistics show that in at least 
two out of every three cases, their use makes it possible to 
stop the fire or delay its progress sufficiently to enable' the
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rescue of the crew and part of the endangered airplanes. 
Stationary extinguishers generally use carbon tetrachloride, 
which is projected on the fire by means of compressed gases. 
Tetrachioride vapor is poisonous owing to its phósgene content 
and in several cases pilots have been inconvenienced by it in 
flight. Its use therefore requires certain precautions, and ex-
tinguishers containing it should not be put into inexperienced 
hands. Thus, while these extinguishers can be safely used on 
military and commercial airplanes, it is doubtful whether they 
should be used, for example, on touring airplanes. The chief 
precaution to be taken in this connection consists in verifying 
periodically the tightness of the tetrachloride pipes and the 
complete absence of leaks. Besides, one must also make sure 
that the compressed-gas container, used for the projeotions 
retains its pressure well and has a sufficient reserve of liquid 
for all emergencies in flight. 
The extinguishing action of tetrachioride increases when 
it is exerted in a confined space where the ventilation is great-
ly reduced. Themost favorable conditions in this respect are 
encountered in an engine compartment, completely enclosed by a 
owling and separated from the ' airplane body by a gas—tight bulk-
head. Aside from: the fact that the tetrachlorIde then has its 
maximum effect any poisonous vapors emitted are stopped by the 
bulkhead, which protects the crew against them. In order to 
confine as closely as possible the space within which the tetra,-
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chloride is used, it is also recommended to close the radiator 
shutters (if there are any) as soon as the extinguisher enters 
into action. When the engine compartment is only partly cowled 
(as in the case of air-cooled engines), the efficacy of the ex-
tinguishers is greatly reduced. This applies particularly to 
engines without any cowling at all as is sometimes the case 
with radial engines and the side engines of some commercial 
airplanes. The advantages of this arrangement, as regards in-
spection in flight, easy access and cooling, are thus counter-
balanced by the difficulty of combating a fire, if one breaks out. 
The nozzles of stationary extinguishers are usually loctted 
in the engine compartments close to the carburetors and float 
chambers. This is generally the most satisfactory arrangement, 
since the fire hazard is greatest there. Besides, one should. 
.make sure, in each case, that the points through which flames are 
liable to brebk forth, are actually those covered by the extin-
guishing jet. On the other hand, the pipes and their accesso-
ries should be arranged so as not to be torn off or destroyed 
by any slight injury to the crank case or carburetor caused, for 
example, by the breaking of aoonnecting rod. Such injuries 
are, in most cses, inevitably followed by violent fires, which 
must be immediately localized to avoid more serious results. The 
use of extinguishers is then of the hig.est importance and it 
would be most unfortunate, if they failed to work at the moment 
when they are most needed.
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Stationary extinguishers should be operated by a quick-
acting and. readily accessible control. In this respect, cocks 
of the quarter-turn type are satisfactory. Slow-motion cocks 
may be added if there is any doubt of the tightness of the quar-
ter-turn cocks. These former would remain closed.on the ground., 
to be opened as soon as the engine is started for the'take-off. 
There should be a stationary extinguisher for each engine corn-
partment, with as many nozzles as there are dangerous points to 
protect. Besides, large airplanes should. also be provided with 
hand. extinguishers at the rate of at least one for each main 
compartment. They should. be of some current type, as put on 
the market for automobiles. 
Lastly, it should be noted that, although extinguishers can 
stop incipient fires, they combat the effects rather than the 
original causes. So long as the cause is not suppressed., a fire 
may again break out after having been extinguished.. This may 
happen when afire is tarted..bya jammed intake valve. If the 
engine continues to run, without the trouble being remedied, the 
uninterrupted back fires will rekindle the conflagration every 
time it is extinguished.. A sufficient amounit of compressed gas 
arid extinguishing liquid. should therefore be available, not only 
to extinguish a first fire but also to stop possible revivals 
and give the imperiled. pilot enough time to stop the engine and. 
even to land.. This would require a reserve corresponding to 
three or four conseOutive extinctions.
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Fire alarms are not as indispensable as fire extinguishers, 
but they form a useful auxiliary. They depend on the use of 
compounds which burn or melt at relatively low temperatures,. 
thereby operating a visible or audible signal, deigned to call 
the attention of the crew to abnormal rises in temperature at 
any point of the airplane. They •reveal the trouble as soon as 
it occurs and enable combating it with the least possible delay. 
Fire alarms are usually simple and inexpensive. They should 
be used in preference to automatic devices which do not merely 
act as alarms, but simultaneously start the extinguishers. Such 
devices are rather complicated and heavy and are always expensive. 
They may function inopportunely, thus using up a reserve of tet-
rachioride which may 'oe.needed later. They may cause needless 
panics and lastly, they may unnecessarily emit disagreeable 
Vapor s. 
Extinguishers, with and without alarms, have already ren-
dered valuable service in aviation. Thus, their use is there-
fore compulsory on all commercial airplanes and in general, on 
all aircraft, the crew of which is qualified to take proper care 
of them. Besides, it is highly desirable that a modification in 
the refining or in the nature of the extinguishing liquid be 
effected, so as to eliminate its poisonous action. These proper-
ties are the only reason which can prevent its general adoption.
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Cleanliness and. Upkeep 
Aeronautical activity is not confined. to the building of 
suitably equipped airplanes provided with efficient fire-
protection devices. It also extends to their maintenance in a 
state of absolute cleanliness. In analyzing the reports of in-
vestigations, one is struck by the high number of conflagrations, 
the causes of which could have been eliminated by proper care. 
Thus, several serious accidents which happened in France in 
l92628, were attributed to imperfect tightness or stoppage of 
carburetor elements, to pipe connections insufficiently tight-
ened in reassembling, to unmounted accessories on the inlet 
pipes which had been badly reassembled, or to inadequate precau-
tions in the handling of inflammable appliances (flares, etc.). 
Those who frequent airports know that when negligent me- - 
chanics refuel, gasoline flows from the refueling hose or the 
filling hole. In the first place these overflows cause an ex-
pensive waste of fuel. Besides, they may damage the portions
of the airplane which they touch. The chief danger, however, 
results from the fact that fuel gets inside the cowling where it 
creates a permanent fire hazard. This is evidenced, by the burn-
ing of an airplane in 1927 during the Michelin Cup race, as a 
result of careless refueling. 
Likewise, the crank case and acaessories of certain engines 
lose their tightness for went of proper maintenance and let the 
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lubricant ooze or sprinkle on the neighboring portions of the 
wing or fuselage. Such leakages form long trains which may 
propagate the fire far from its origin. The spongy state of 
the fuel or oil of these trains increases their inflammability. 
We should not omit to recall, in this connection, the two 
or three fires per month which occurred in military aviation 
in l925-2S on the ground, while starting the engines. In most 
cases, these fires had no serious consequences and were extin-
guished either by the crew or by the safety service bf the air-
port. They have, however, a great indicative value. They can-
not be attributed to any fault of the materiel, since the fires 
broke out at the take-off,. i.e., immediately after the nateriel 
should have been inspected and carefully overhauled. It must 
therefore be assumed that fuel or oil trains left in the engine 
cowling, rendered the air about the airplane highly inflammable. 
Under such conditions, the slightest back fire, quite natural 
on a cold engine, would start a conflagration.. It is most f or-
tunate that these fires occur-red on . the ground where powerful 
means of combating them were available. These facts show the 
importance of keeping airplanes in a state of perfect cleanli-
ness. It is certainly possible to avoid any considerable oil 
leakage on engines, even after long flights. Thus, Lindbergh's 
airplane, at the end of its transatlantic flight, impressed all 
Who saw it by the cleanliness of its engine and by the almost 
perfect oil tightness it revealed.
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In this connection, attention is called to the methoical 
cleaning required. by certain American air traffic companies for 
maintaining cleanliness on their airplanes. Every week a clean-
ing is made with a jet of air, compressed at about 4 kg/cm2 
(56.9 lb./sq.in.). This jet drives either kerosene or a mixture 
of 50% paraff in and. 50% gasoline. After each flight, or at 
least every week, the wings are cleaned with soapy water (about 
20 grams of soap per liter of water), followed by rinsing with 
water. Lastly, the fuselage is cleaned by a jet of air, com-
pressed at 4 kg/cm2. The general adoption of such thorough 
methods of cleaning would. doubtless greatly increase the comfort 
and the safety against fire. I-n any case there is room for much 
improvement, but a veritable campaign would. have to be under-
taken in order to convince every one of its necessity. 
C o n c 1 u s i a n s 
General considerations and examples..- Two examples will 
show how fire spreads on airplanes and. how the means to combat 
it are used.. These examples date back several years, to a time 
when precautions were not so complete and strict as now. They 
are all the more interesting to examine on that account. 
On February 16, 1925, the pilot of a single-seater, flying 
at an altitude of 1500 m.(4900 ft.), saw flames bursting forth 
from the left side of the engine compartment. The fire was due 
to the rupture of a connecting' iod which staved in the crank
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case. The oil spread inside the cowling andcaught fire.. The 
pilot immediately operated the stationary fire extinguisher. 
Unfortunately, the cock.was not readily accessible and required. 
several turns to get it wide open. Time elapsed and the fire 
spread. As there is no fire wall, the flames first reached the 
tank afld even the pilot, who was slightly burned. He irrirnedi-
ately dropped the taflk, which was already marked by the fire. 
The flames now attacked the fuselage. The action of the fire 
extinguisher, however, became manifest. Besides, the pilot, in 
dropping the tank, deprived the fire of its most dangerous ally. 
The flames gradually subsided and disappeared. When the airplane 
reached the ground, the fire was completely extinguished. Un-
fortunately, the landing was very rough and the pilot was found 
dead in his cockpit by those who ran to his aid. His.burns, 
though only slight, the poisonous vapors which he ma have 
breathed (since no bulkhead prevented them from reaching the 
fuselage), and finally the quick succession of events probably 
left him no time to make the. straightening maneuver which might 
have saved him. This accident demonstrated. the efficacy of fire 
extinguishers and of dropping the tank, the importance of the: 
easy accesibility and quick operation of the fire extinguishers 
and the need of fireproof bulkheads. . 	 .	 . 
The second example is that of a fire which occurred March 
24, 1926. The flight started unde normal conditions, but clap-
ping sounds coming from the inlet side were soon heard, and al-
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most immediately flames burst forth from the engthe compartment. 
The clapping sounds revealed carburetor troubles due to irregu-
lar fuel supply (There was a leak in the joint of the fuel pipe 
leading to the carburetor) and perhaps to an abnormal air in-
take (The air shutter of the carburetor was missing, and the 
holes for the shutter spindles remained open). Bad carburetion 
caused back-firig. But, since the air inlet pipe of the car-
buretor opened outside the fuselage, these back fires should 
have been harmless. Unfortunately, the flames found passage 
through the holes left open by the missing shutter. They pene-
trated into the engine compartment. 0i the other hand the leak-
age from the fuel pipe carburetor connection, close by,. supplied 
the fuel for the flames. Fire broke out. The pilot immediately 
operated the extinguisher. At the same time he closed the radi-
ator shutters, which increased the efficacy of the tetrachioride. 
He thus succeeded in mastering the fire, and the flames were ex-
tinguished. But, although the .extinuisher suppressed the im-
mediate effect of the conflagration, it was unable to eliminate 
the original causes (fuel leakage and penetration of air) which 
still persisted. The fire revived and the flames again burst 
forth. from the engine cowling. In the meantime, the menaced 
pilot brought his airplane to the ground and succeeded in land-
ing without accident. Scarcely had he left the cockpit with his 
observer, when the whole airplane we.s a mass of flames. This 
accident illustrated the serious consequences of bad maintenance
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of the carburetor accessories and fuel pipes, the necessity for 
absolute tightness of the air inlet pipes and the efficacy of 
fire extinguishers, requiring, however, a sufficient amount of 
tetrachloride to stop several consecutive fires in the course of 
the same flight. 
The analysis of these accidents confirms, in a concrete Way, 
the general conclusions of the present report, Which may be sum-
marized as follows: There is and can be no absolutely reliable 
means of preventing airplane fires.. Even the substitution of so-
called safety fuels or heavy oil for gasoline, in spite of the 
undeniable advantages which they would offer from the viewpoint 
of safety, would still leave certain risks, which could be over-
come only by special precautions. There is .a great variety of 
possible causes of fires and of the conditions under which they 
spread, as also of the correspcnding precautions. None of them 
should be neglected. Also, no precaution should be exalted to 
the prejudice of others, since it will be possible to achieve 
actual safty only by combining their *effects. 
During the last three years considerable effort has been 
made in France to reduce fire hazards. The consequences are 
now becomingmanifest. Out of a total number of 183 accidents, 
recorded by the Bureau Veritas in 1926, there were 14 fires 
(7.6%), while this proportion decreased in 1927 to 6 out of 206 
( 3%) . Of course, this decrease in the percentage will have to 
be maintained for several yeaxs before it cafl be considered per-
I
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manent. We may look forward With optimism, however, since pre-
cautions do not usually become fully effective for some time af-
ter they have been adopted. 
Program of Investigation and. Research 
In any case, the efforts should be continued and intensi-
fled. The program to be followed has been directly derived from. 
the considerations of the preceding chapters and takes the fol-
lowing form: 
1. Tests and. regulations Which may take immediate effect: 
Improvement of the tightness of •the. air-inlet pipes up to. 
the point where they open out side the fuselage. 
Improvement of the fuel and. flame tightness of the fire 
walls; rapid elimination of airplanes not provided with complete 
fire walls. 
General adoption of stationary fire extinguishers on all 
airplanes, the crews of vhich have ädequate means for their main-
t en an c e. 
Gradual elimination of rubber connections for fuel and oil 
pipes; substitution of metal joints wherever special elasticity 
is not required; methodical reduction of the number of joints, 
wherever their presence is not indispensable. 
General adoption of fire-prevention devices and of protect-
ive casings for ignition wires. 
Revision and improvement, from the viewpoint of fire preven-
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tion, of the existing installations for heating the intake air 
and the carburetors. 
Revision and improvement of the conditions under which fuel 
tanks have to withstand horizontal and vertical stresses in 
flight. 
Campaign by regulations and posters, showing the paramount 
necessity of careful maintenance and. absolute ' cleanliness on 
airplanes. 
2. Investigations, to be undertaken or continued, likely 
to give results shortly: 
Improvement of exhaust pipes, mufflers and fire screens now 
in use; methodical study of the cooling conditions of these de-
vices and investigations for the pulpose of eliminating danger-
ous hot spots; drafting of test regulations in order, to deter-
mine whether the devices presented meet the safety requirements 
in this respect. 
Improvement of the present conditions of construction and 
acceptance of fuel and oil tanks, especially as regards the test 
pressure, the resistance of attachment fittings to normal streses 
the	 . 
stresses,/bulkheads, the resistance of tanks and their fittings 
to horizontal impacts. 
Design and construction of joints for fuel and oil pipes 
to satisfy the regulations of the new S,T.I.Aé. competition. 
Design and testing of stuffing boxes and joints for the
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tight passage of controls and pipes through the fire wall. 
Design and testing, from the viewpoint of fire prevention, 
of standard devices for heating the intake air arid carburetors. 
3. Extensive investigations to be undertaken or continued: 
Experimentation axid research concerning the possibiities 
and conditions of' using safety fuels on aviation engines. 
Experimentation and research concerning heavy-oil aviation 
engines. 
Methodical investigation of the ignition conditions of gas-
oline, safety fuels and. heavy oil as regards hot spots, sparks, 
incandescent coke, etc.; variations of these conditions as a 
functiom of pressure xid. temperature. 
Investigations regarding the production and.. use of nonpoi-
sonous extinguisher liquids. 
Systematic tests dealing with the resistance and tightness 
of fuel and oil pipes to repeated vibrations, surging and. im-
pacts due to landing on the nose; experimental determination of 
the accelerations set up in this case; study of the influence 
exerted by the nuiiiber, distribution arid resistance of bulkheads 
on the general resistance of' the tank to impacts; design of 
tanks capable of withstanding the impacts (special devices for 
the tank and its attachment fittings; relative weiglt arid space 
requirements). 
Investigations regarding the best location of tanks on air-
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planes. Possible design. of a truss or cage, capable of partially 
protecting the engine, the fire wall and the tanks against direct 
impacts following landings on the nose; design of a fire wall 
capable of withstanding the above impacts. 
This program is very extensive, but is justified by the 
value of the human lives and of the property to be protected. 
The investigations and researches mentioned in each paragraph 
have been, when possible, arranged in the order of their irnpor-
tarice. The measures outlined in the first p aragraph will enable 
an almost immediate improVement in safety conditiOns. Their 
adoption Will depend chiefly on the atitüde of the designers 
and. users of airplanes. On the completion of an airplane, both 
should see that the necessary precautions are applied. Besides, 
they should periodically make sure that these precautions have 
not been impaired in service and still retain all their original 
efficacy. 
One of the objects of the present treatise will be acaom-
pUshed if it succeeds in convincing some designers and pilots 
of the fundental importance of these points. The studies and. 
investigations contemplated by the rest of the program are chief-
ly in the province of technical services and laboratories. They 
will require time, and their results will be manifest only after 
a long time. This fact, however, will only improve their effi-
cacy. Several of these investigations are now being made (chief-
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ly at the S.T.I.Aé.) and are nearing successful completion.. It 
is hoped that the present treatise, in specifying the numerous 
elements of the fire-prevention problem, will help to render its 
solution more rapid and complete. 
Tran slation by 
National Advisory Committee 
for Aeronautics.
